The Court of First Instance of the European Communities by Weidner, Neil J.
NOTES 
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In light of the increasing difficulties facing the Court of Justice as 
a result of its heavy caseload, the Council of Ministers of the Euro-
pean Communities (Council) unanimously adopted a decision on Oc-
tober 24, 1988, to create a Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities (Court of First Instance). 1 The newly created court es-
sentially is intended to assume a "trial court" role over certain classes 
of cases formerly within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. 2 By 
relieving the Court of Justice of some of its caseload, the Council be-
lieved it would, inter alia, "enable the Court [of Justice] to concen-
trate its activities on its fundamental task of ensuring uniform 
interpretation of Community law."3 
On September 1, 1989, the Court of First Instance officially be-
gan its operations.4 The court, however, did not actually take up its 
duties until October 1989 and did not hold its first full session until 
December 14, 1989.5 Nonetheless, the court has been fairly produc-
tive in the short period of time it has been functioning, rendering fifty-
• The author would like to thank Professor Peter E. Herzog for his invaluable advice 
and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Note. Any errors or shortcomings in the Note, 
however, are solely the products of the author's own judgment. 
1. See Council Decision of October 24, 1988, establishing the Court of First Instance of 
the European Communities, 31 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 313) 1 (1988) [hereinafter Council 
Decision], amended 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 215) 1 (1989). In order to avoid confusion, 
future reference to the Council's Decision will only be made to the amended version. There 
are no substantive differences between the two versions of the decision. The Council was em-
powered to establish the Court of First Instance of the European Communities [hereinafter 
CFI], pursuant to the power vested in it by the Single European Act. See infra notes 51-55 and 
accompanying text for further discussion regarding the establishment of the CFI. 
2. As discussed further below, see infra notes 135-158 and accompanying text, labeling 
the CFI a "trial court" is essentially inaccurate as the new court will not conduct trials as the 
term is understood in common law countries. My reference to the CFI as a trial court is due 
mainly to the fact that the CFl's primary task is to be a fact-finding court. 
3. See Council Decision, supra note 1, at preamble. 
4. Court of First Instance Starts Operations, 638 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH), Aug. 24, 
1989. 
5. See XXIIIRD GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNI-
TIES 1989, at 41-42 (1990). The judges appointed to the new court were not sworn in until 
September 25, 1990. See Buchan, Relief at Hand for Eurocourt, Fin. Times, Sept. 26, 1989, at 
2, col. 6. 
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eight decisions by the end of 1990. 6 A number of these decisions have 
been appealed to the Court of Justice. 7 
The purpose of this Note is to examine the organization and 
structure of the Court of First Instance to determine whether it is 
suited to assume its role as a trial court. In particular, emphasis will 
be placed on the new court's ability to be a fact-finder as this is one of 
its primary tasks. It may be helpful in this connection to first review 
the role and function of the Court of Justice within the European 
Community; and, then the circumstances under which the Commu-
nity chose to attach a lower level court to the Court of Justice. With 
this as a foundation, the Note will then examine the Council's deci-
sion which setup the basic structure of the new court. The Note will 
also examine some aspects of the Court of First Instance's newly for-
mulated rules of procedure. Finally, some thoughts will be given as to 
the expected long-term impact of the Court of First Instance on the 
Court of Justice and the European Community in general. 
II. THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
The Court of Justice serves as the legal body of the three commu-
nities created under the European Economic Treaty, European Coal 
and Steel Treaty and European Atomic Energy Treaty.8 Its basic task 
is to insure that in the interpretation and application of these treaties 
the "law is observed. "9 The Court of Justice also assumes a broader 
6. The CFI decided no cases in 1989, and 58 cases in 1990. (Information supplied by the 
Registrar of the Court). 
7. In 1990, there were 19 appeals taken to the Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities [hereinafter ECJ] from decisions of the CFI. (Information supplied by the Registrar of 
the Court). 
8. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 167-
88, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, Apr. 18, 1951, arts. 31-45, 298 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty]; Treaty 
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 136-60, 298 
U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter EURATOM Treaty]. For the official English translations of the 
Community Treaties see OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNl-
TIES, TREATIES EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNmES (1987). 
9. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 164. For purposes of simplicity reference will be 
made only to the provisions in the EEC Treaty dealing with the ECJ. These provisions are 
essentially identical to those contained in the ECSC and EURA TOM Treaties. 
Community law collectively consists of the law laid down by the Member States and the 
law laid down by Community Institutions. See Lenz, The Court of Justice of European Com-
munities, 14 EuR. L. REV. 127, 128 (1989). Community law laid down by the Member States 
includes the treaties establishing the European Community, as amended, the three accession 
treaties, and the Single European Act of 1987. Id. Community law created by the Institutions 
of the Community, known as secondary or derived Community law, comes in various forms -
e.g., Council or Commission decisions, regulations or directives, which vary with respect to 
their binding character. See id. Community law also includes the international agreements 
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role in that its caselaw is an important element in producing greater 
intergration of the Member States in the Community by being "con-
vincing, coherent, and based on clear objectives."10 
As the principal legal body of the Community, the Court of Jus-
tice hears a wide variety of cases. Prior to the creation of the Court of 
First Instance, the court had jurisdiction to hear the following types 
of cases: 
1. Disputes between Community Institutions and their employ-
ees (so called "staff cases"); 11 
2. Requests for preliminary rulings by the courts of the Mem-
ber States; 12 
3. Cases involving the review of decisions or rulings made by 
Institutions13 of the Community;14 
4. Actions by the Commission or other Member States to have 
a particular Member State declared in breach of its treaty 
obligations; 1 s 
5. Actions by individuals or firms for damages based on tort or 
contract claims; 16 
6. Disputes between Member States which relate to the subject 
matter of the Community treaties. 17 
For purposes of this Note, it is not necessary to delve into each of 
entered into by the Community with non-member countries and other international organiza-
tions. Id. 
10. See Everling, The Court of Justice as a Decision Making Authority, 82 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
1294, 1295 (1984). 
11. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 179. 
12. See id. at art. 177. Under the EEC Treaty, the ECJ has jurisdiction to give prelimi-
nary rulings concerning: a) the interpretation of the EEC Treaty; b) the validity and interpre-
tation of acts of the Institutions of the Community; and, c) the interpretation of the statutes of 
bodies established by an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide. Id. Requests for 
preliminary rulings are made by courts and tribunals of the Member States. Id. Parallel provi-
sions to article 177 of the EEC Treaty are found in the ECSC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 41, 
and the EURATOM Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 150, as well as, in the Brussels Convention. 
See Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 15 0.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 299) 23 (1972), unofficial text of the 
Convention, incorporating all amendments, was published at 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 189) 
35 (1990). 
13. The Institutions of the Community include the European Parliament, the Council, 
the Commission and the ECJ. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at arts. 137-88. Ancillary Insti-
tutions of the Community include the Economic and Social Committee and the Court of Audi-
tors. See id. at arts. 193-98 and 206-09. 
14. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at arts. 173 and 175. The ECJ reviews both individual 
(quasi-judicial) and general (quasi-legislative) decisions of the Community Institutions. 
15. See id. at arts. 169 and 170. 
16. See id. at arts. 178, 181 and 215. 
17. See id. at art. 182. The ECJ will have jurisdiction over such disputes only if the 
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the categories mentioned above. It is, however, relevant to observe 
that in the early to mid 1980s the Court of Justice had found it in-
creasingly difficult to deal efficiently and expeditiously with the cases 
it heard. 18 This was primarily due to the increased complexity of the 
factual issues involved in resolving some of them and to the increased 
caseload of the court.19 
A. Cases Involving Complex Factual Issues 
Cases involving time consuming factual inquiries include in par-
ticular "staff cases"20 and competition related cases.21 Concerning 
staff cases, these actions often raise no significant legal issues. Rather, 
they involve extensive factual investigations to determine whether an 
employee has been treated in a manner inconsistent with Community 
law.22 The Court of Justice had found these cases to be a nuisance 
and had previously attempted on several occassions to have them re-
moved to another forum. 23 
Concerning competition related cases, such actions involve al-
leged violations of Community law regarding agreements in restraint 
disputes are submitted to the ECJ under a special agreement between the parties. See id. at 
art. 100. 
18. See infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text. 
19. There are a number of reasons for the increase in the ECJ's caseload; these include, 
among others, the accession of Spain and Portugal into the Community, and the numerous 
directives and regulations that have been made in order to gradually give effect to the princi-
ples and objectives of the Community treaties. See Slynn, Court of First Instance of the Euro-
pean Communities, 9 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 542, 542-43 (1985). There is likely to be a 
continued increase in the caseload as rules and directives are adopted to give effect to the 
Single European Act, which calls for the creation of a single "Internal Market" by 1992. Id. 
20. As discussed further below in the section on the CFI, the ECJ no longer has jurisdic-
tion to bear these cases at first instance. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
21. See Slynn, supra note 19, at 543. 
22. See id. Staff cases involve "disputes between the Communit[y] and their servants 
referred to in article 179 of the EEC Treaty and in article 152 of the [EURATOM] Treaty." 
See Council Decision, supra note 1, at art. 3(1). Typical staff cases involve allegations of 
wrongful discharge, sex discrimination and improper promotion procedures. See, e.g. Bonino 
v. Commission, Case 233/85, 30 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. C 57) 4 -(1987) (Article 25 of the Staff 
Regulations of Officials of the European Communities does not require the appointing author-
ity to give its reasons for a decision assigning an official to a new post; the presence of women 
among the applicants for the post, and the principle of equal treatment for men and women, in 
no way affects this holding). 
23. See Kennedy, The Essential Minimum: the Establishment of the Court of First In-
stance, 14 EUR. L. REV. 7, 22 (1989). "Suits by Community employees have comprised 
roughly one-third of the Court of Justice's caseload ... and although most of the cases were 
heard by three-judge_chambers rather than the full court, members of the Court of Justice and 
other commentators have, for more than a decade, seen no real need to burden the Court with 
those cases, which often involve trivial issues." See Court of First Instance Starts Operations, 
supra note 4, at 1. 
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of trade, mergers and state subsidies. 24 In addition to raising complex 
legal and policy issues, these types of cases require the Court of J us-
tice to make extensive factual investigations. 2s The Court may often 
be required to sift through thousands of pages of documents, 26 as well 
as, hear entensive expert testimony. 
The inability of the Court of Justice to efficiently deal with com-
petition related cases is significant. Because the functions of the Euro-
pean Community are essentially economic in nature, the Court of 
Justice's most important case law is to be found in this area.27 The 
inability of the court to timely address competition related issues aris-
ing in such cases potentially hinders the integration of the economies 
of the Member States, which is the basic aim of the Community. 28 
24. Related procedural problems occur in connection with dumping cases brought under 
the Community's anti-dumping regulation. See Council Reg. No. 2423/88 of July 11, 1988 on 
Protection against Dumped or Subsidized Imports From Countries Not Members of the Euro-
pean Community, 31 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 209) 1 (1988). 
My comments concerning the increased difficulty of the ECJ to deal with competition 
related cases are primarily directed at the cases that are appealed to the ECJ from the Com-
mission rather than requests for preliminary rulings by the national courts of the Member 
States. The latter types of cases essentially raise only legal issues as factual findings are made 
by the national court of the Member State making the request. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, 
at art. 177; but see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text concerning preliminary rulings on 
the classification of products under the common customs tariffs. 
For general reference, Community competition law is enforced by either the Commission 
or by the national courts of the Member States. See OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, EEC CoMPETITION POLICY IN THE SINGLE MARKET 44-56 (manu-
script) (1989) [hereinafter EEC CoMPETITION POLICY]. The advantage for a private legal 
person raising a claim in a national court is the possibility that he may recover damages. Id. at 
44. In an action before the Commission, an individual who has claimed to have been injured 
by a breach of Community competition law may not recover damages, in fact he is not even a 
formal party to the proceedings. Id. The individual merely informs the Commission of the 
violation, which in tum investigates the claim and takes action accordingly. Id. Rulings by 
the Commission may then be appealed to the ECJ. Id. 
The current trend has been for individuals to use the Commission rather than go to the 
national courts of the Member States. Id. It should be noted that the Commission may also 
act on its own motion. See Regulation No. 17/62, 5 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 204) 35 (1962). 
25. See Slynn, supra note 19, at 545; see also Kennedy, supra note 23, at 22-23. 
26. See Slynn, supra note 19, at 544. 
27. See Lenz, supra note 9, at 132. There is evidence that Community competition law 
will continue to grow in importance. See Hawk, The Proposed Revisions to the Justice Depart-
ment's Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations and Recent Developments in EEC 
Competition Law, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 299, 308 (1988). 
"EEC Competition law continues to grow in importance. This movement will acceler-
ate for two reasons. The Community is going through its own deregulation wave, nota-
bly in telecommunications, air transport, and public procurement. More importantly, 
the Member States' agreement to remove all government barriers to interstate trade by 
1992 is generating support for stronger competition law enforcement at the Community 
level." Id. 
28. The basic aim of the Community is to create a single "common market" through the 
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B. Methods of Inquiry Available to the Court of Justice 
Some have observed that the Court of Justice is ill-suited to per-
form the task of fact-finding. 29 The rules of procedure of the Court of 
Justice, however, clearly show that the court has a number of investi-
gatory devices available to it. 30 These include the ability to request 
information and documents from parties. 31 The procedural rules also 
allow the court to hear testimony of witnesses, receive expert reports 
and question the parties themselves. 32 These methods of inquiry ap-
pear to be adequate enough to make any kind of factual investigation 
a case may require. In the past, however, the ability and willingness 
of the court to use such devices has been affected by its heavy 
caseload. 
C. The Increased Caseload of the Court of Justice and its Effects 
The growing number and complexity of cases brought before the 
Court of Justice has had a significant impact on the smooth operation 
of the court. 33 Over the last decade there has been a marked increase 
in the amount of time it has taken the court to dispose of a case, 
whether it be a direct action or a request for a preliminary ruling. 34 
Because of the delays, a large backlog of cases has been built up. 
The following statistics illustrate the increased burden of the 
Court of Justice. In 1978, there were 268 cases brought before the 
Court of Justice.3s At that time it took approximately six months to 
get a preliminary ruling and nine months to get a decision on a direct 
action.36 By 1983, the number of cases brought before the court in-
creased to 297;37 and, the amount of time it took to render prelimi-
elimination of all distortions of trade between Member Countries. See EEC CoMPETITION 
POLICY, supra note 24, at 9. 
29. See Everling, supra note 10, at 1297. 
30. See Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, art. 45, 
17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 350) 1 (1974) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure of the ECJ]. 
31. See id. at art. 45 § 2. 
32. Id. 
33. "Until the arrival of the Court of First Instance [the ECJ] had to act as a court of first 
and last instance and determine facts in a considerable number of factually complex cases. The 
result of this dual role was a steady build-up in the number of cases awaiting judgment and an 
increase in the duration of proceedings to an extent which had become unacceptable[.]" See 
Rice, Europe Learns to Love its Court, Fin. Times, June 6, 1990, § I, at 22, col. 3. 
34. See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 8. 
35. See TwELFTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITIES 1978, at 367 (1979). 
36. See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 8. 
37. See SEVENTEENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES 1983, at 348 (1984). 
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nary rulings increased to twelve months, while decisions on direct 
actions increased to fourteen months. 38 Five years later, in 1988, 
more than 370 cases were brought before the court,39 and it took on 
average eighteen months to render preliminary rulings and more than 
twenty-four months to render decisions on direct actions. 40 Because 
of the increased caseload and the resulting time delay for their dispo-
sition, the number of cases pending before the court increased from 
261 in 1978, 41 to 486 in 198342 and to 594 in 1988. 43 
The Court of Justice gradually became aware that its growing 
caseload was hindering it from carrying out the tasks entrusted to it 
under the Community treaties.44 For instance, it was believed that 
national courts of the Member States were being discouraged from 
applying for reference opinions concerning Community law because 
of the expected time delay in receiving a ruling. 43 A trend such as 
this, if not addressed, would adversely affect the Court of Justice's 
ability to insure the uniform interpretation of Community law. 
Over the years a number of measures were adopted in an attempt 
to increase the efficiency of the Court of Justice in order to ease the 
adverse effects of its heavy caseload.46 For example, several amend-
ments were made to the court's procedural rules so as to improve the 
way actions were handled.47 There was also an increased tendency to 
38. EC Bulletin, Nov./Dec. 11 (Price Water House 1989). 
39. See XXIIND GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcnvmES OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNI-
TIES 1988, at 448 (1989) (372 cases were brought before the ECJ). 
40. EC Bulletin, supra note 38, at 11. In 1989, 385 actions were brought before the ECJ. 
See XXIllRD GENERAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 436. 
41. See TwELFTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 367. 
42. The number of cases pending before the ECJ have been adjusted to reflect the fact 
that a number of related cases were consolidated and treated as one case. The unadjusted 
figure for 1983 is 1,100 cases. See SEVENTEENTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 348. 
43. See XXIIND GENERAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 448. 
44. See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 7. In a memorandum to the Council in 1978, the ECJ 
indicated "[t]he [Court's] workload is constantly increasing at an ever faster rate. It is already 
near the limit of what can be done with the Court's present man power on the basis of the 
present legislation." See id. at 2 n.2 (citing Memorandum of July 21, 1978, published in the 
bulletin of the news agency "Europe"). 
45. See id. 
46. See T. MILLET, THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES 
3-6 (1990). The measures adopted "may be grouped under three head[ings]: steps to increase 
the manpower of the ECJ, steps to streamline the procedure of the ECJ, and steps to establish 
first instance tribunals." Id. at 3. 
47. In 1979, the ECJ's Rules of Procedure were amended to improve the way the court 
handled cases. See Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities of 12 September 1979, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 238) 1 (1979) 
[hereinafter Amendments]. In order to further streamline the proceedings before the ECJ, 
stringent limits on the speaking time allowed to parties at hearings were imposed. See T. 
MILLET, supra note 46, at 5. 
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refer cases to the three or five judge "chambers" rather than the entire 
court.48 
Though the measures adopted were helpful, they were inade-
quate as an effective long term solution. 49 Once realizing this, the 
Community, in particular the Court of Justice, began to seriously con-
sider the establishment of a lower level court to which it could trans-
fer some of its cases. so 
III. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 
A. The Creation of the Court of First Instance 
In early 1986, the members of the EEC signed, and later ratified, 
a supplementary treaty to the existing Community treaties called the 
Single European Act (SEA).s1 Article 11 of the SEA inserted a new 
provision, article l 68a, into the EEC Treaty. s2 This new provision 
empowered the Council, at the request of the Court of Justice and 
after consultation with the Commission, to establish a court of first 
instance of the European Communities. s3 After receiving a formal 
request from the court,s4 the Council exercised this power by unani-
mously adopting a decision (Decision) on October 24, 1988, officially 
creating the Court of First Instance. ss As previously noted, the basic 
objective of the Council in creating the Court of First Instance was to 
48. The 1979 Amendments to the ECJ's Rules of Procedure, inter a/ia, increased the 
types of preliminary rulings which could be assigned to chambers and also allowed certain 
actions brought by natural or legal persons to be assigned to chambers as well. See Amend., 
ments, supra note 47, at art. 9S(l). 
49. See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 13. "(W]elcome though the changes in the European 
Court's procedures and the increase in the number of members were, those measures were 
insufficient and the situation continued to deteriorate. . . . [I]t had become increasingly clear, 
by 198S, that the efforts of the [ECJ] alone could not suffice to resolve the problems which it 
faced." Id. 
SO. See Schermers, The European Court of First Instance, 2S COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
S41, S42-43 (1988); see also Slynn, supra note 19, at S44. 
Sl. The Single European Act, 30 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987) [hereinafter 
SEA]. 
S2. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 168a. Articles 4 and 26 of the SEA respectively 
provide that parallel provisions to article 168a be inserted in the ECSC [32(d)] and 
EURATOM [140(a)] Treaties. To simplify matters, reference is made hereinafter to only the 
EEC Treaty; unless otherwise stated, it may be assumed that references to the relevant provi-
sions in the ECSC and EURA TOM Treaties are also intended. 
S3. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 168a(l). The SEA also provided for an amend-
ment to article 188 of the EEC Treaty. See SEA, supra note 49, at art. 12. The article empow-
ered the Council, under the same conditions as in article 168a, to amend Title III of the 
Protocol Establishing the Statute of the Court of Justice, to create the rules and organizational 
structure of the CFI. See id.; see also infra note 130. 
S4. See Schermers, supra note SO, at S43. 
SS. See Council Decision, supra note 1. 
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reduce the heavy caseload of the over-burdened Court of Justice.56 
By relieving the court of original jurisdiction over "certain classes of 
cases," it was believed that the Court of Justice would be in a better 
position to focus on its fundamental task of ensuring uniform inter-
pretation and application of Community law. 57 In addition, it was 
also believed that by transferring certain types of cases to the Court of 
First Instance, particularly those which required close examination of 
complex facts, judicial protection of individual interests would be im-
proved within the Community. 58 
The role of the Court of First Instance is essentially that of a trial 
court in that its principle task is fact-finding. As has been discussed, 
the Court of Justice is not well suited - either because of its caseload 
or the methods of inquiry available to it, to make the type of extensive 
factual inquiries that are often involved in, for example, antitrust and 
state subsidy cases. 59 Accordingly, in establishing the jurisdiction, 
structure and procedural rules of the Court of First Instance, the 
Council had to consider the basic role of the new court and the pur-
ported inadequacies of the Court of Justice. 
B. Jurisdiction 
Pursuant to article 168a of the EEC Treaty, the Court of First 
Instance may be given jurisdiction to "determine at first instance, sub-
ject to the right of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law only 
... certain classes of action or proceeding brought by natural or legal 
persons."60 This provision left the Council to determine what specific 
classes of cases would be within the jurisdiction of the new court. The 
provision did, however, exclusively reserve to the Court of Justice ju-
risdiction over cases brought by Member States or by Community In-
stitutions, and questions referred by national courts for preliminary 
rulings under article 177 of the EEC Treaty. 61 
The Council could have chosen to grant the widest possible range 
of jurisdiction permissible under article 168a. Such a decision would 
have substantially reduced the burden on the Court of Justice by leav-
ing it original jurisdiction only over those cases noted above. The 
Council chose, however, to follow the more pragmatic and measured 
56. See EC Bulletin, supra note 38, at 10. 
57. See Council Decision, supra note l, at preamble. 
58. See id. 
59. See Lang, The Impact of the New Court of First Instance in EEC Anti-trust Cases, in 
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 579 (1988). 
60. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 168a(l). 
61. See id. 
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approach suggested by the Court of Justice in its proposal to the 
Council. This was to transfer jurisdiction of certain well defined mat-
ters to be enumerated individually. 62 
Under article 3( 1) of the Council Decision, the Court of First 
Instance will exercise jurisdiction over three categories of cases: 
1. Disputes between the Community Institutions and their em-
ployees, i.e., "staff cases";63 
2. Actions brought against the Commission with respect to its 
decisions enforcing provisions of the European Coal and Steel Treaty 
(ECSC) relating to levies, production, prices and competition;64 
3. Cases brought by natural or legal persons against Commu-
nity Institutions relating to the implementation of the competition 
rules applicable to undertakings under articles 85 and 86 of the EEC 
Treaty.6s 
Furthermore, in instances where actions falling into the above catego-
ries are accompanied by claims for damages, the Council Decision 
provides that the Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to hear 
such claims. 66 The court will not have jurisdiction to hear these 
claims under any other circumstances. 67 
With respect to the first category of cases, it was believed that 
while they were always important to the individuals who brought 
them, staff cases rarely raised general principles of law and essentially 
involved factual inquiries. 68 The reason they had come before the 
Court of Justice was simply that there was no other forum for them to 
be heard.69 As previously noted, the Court of Justice had suggested 
that these cases be transferred to another forum which had better fa-
cilities and more time to investigate issues of fact, and which had a 
greater opportunity to reach possible compromises. 70 Hence, it seems 
appropriate that original jurisdiction over staff cases be given to the 
Court of First Instance. 
62. See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 21. 
63. See Council Decision, supra note 1, at art. 3(1). 
64. See id. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. at art. 3(2). 
67. See Council Decision, supra note 1, at art. 3(2). 
68. See Slynn, supra note 19, at 543. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. The transfer of staff cases to a tribunal of first instance has been on the Com-
munity's agenda since 1974. See Schermers, supra note 50, at 542; see also Proposal for a 
Council Regulation (Euratom, ECSC, EEC) amending Staff Regulations of Officials and Con-
ditions of Employment of other Servants of the European Communities and establishing an 
Administrative Tribunal of the European Communities, 21 O.J. (No. C225) 6 (1978). 
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The second category of cases involves claims brought against the 
Commission under the ECSC Treaty by undertakings or association 
of undertakings alleging that Commission decisions concerning them 
were invalid. 71 The decisions in question relate to the imposition of 
levies on the production of coal and steel, the fixing of prices or quo-
tas, and rulings concerning restrictive practices and abuses of a domi-
nant market position. 72 These cases often involve very complex 
factual inquiries as well as analysis of difficult legal and policy issues. 
Hence, like the previous category of cases, it is appropriate they be 
given to the Court of First Instance. 
Significantly, with respect to the above category of cases, because 
the Court of First Instance will be better able than the Court of Jus-
tice to review more critically the factual findings and conclusions of 
the Commission's decisions, there may be an increased burden on the 
Commission to substantiate its decision. 73 
The last category of cases concern decisions by the Commission 
or Council against natural and legal persons for violations of the 
Community antitrust laws contained in articles 85 and 86 of the EEC 
Treaty. 74 This category of cases also includes actions brought by nat-
ural or legal persons claiming that these Community Institutions have 
failed to act when called upon to do so in regard to these treaty provi-
sions. 7s The removal of these cases to the Court of First Instance will 
have a similar impact as the removal of the previous category of cases 
with respect to the Commission's burden of making factual inquiries. 
71. See T. MILLET, supra note 46, at 24-25. A Commission decision may be declared 
invalid if it is, among other things, ultra vires or involves a misuse of power. Slynn, supra note 
19, at 545. 
72. See Slynn, supra note 19, at 545. 
73. See Lang, supra note 59, at 592. "It is clear that ... the overall effect of the new court 
will be to review the Commission's economic assessments and findings of fact more critically 
and more closely than" the ECJ has done in the past. See id. 
The Commission itself is over burdened with work and the Community may need to 
expand its capacity. In the past, for example, the increased workload of the Commission has 
hindered its ability to investigate possible violations of Community laws. See Jacobs, Civil 
Enforcement of EEC Antitrust Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1367 (1984). As a result, the 
competition laws have not served as a strong deterrent because of the selective nature in which 
they are enforced. Id. 
74. Article 85 relates to agreements and concerted practices between undertakings which 
aim to, or do in fact, prevent, restrain or distort competition within the Common Market. See 
EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 85. Article 86 relates to abuse of dominant positions within 
the Common Market. Id. at art. 86. Both articles are aimed at preserving and enhancing 
Community competition rules by different means. Article 85 focuses on agreements or con-
certed practices between two or more enterprises, whereas article 86 is directed at abusive 
behavior by monopolies or firms with very considerable power. See EEC COMPETITION POL-
ICY, supra note 24, at 13. 
75. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at arts. 85 and 86. 
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Significantly, considering the basic mission of the new court, it is less 
likely that the Court of First Instance will adopt, as the Court of Jus-
tice has sometimes done, the findings of the Commission without 
making substantial inquiry itself into the facts. 76 As noted earlier, the 
reason for the Court of Justice being less inquisitorial as to factual 
issues than perhaps it should be is directly related to its heavy 
caseload. 
The removal of the types of cases listed above, particularly those 
cases dealing with commercial law, will allow the Court of Justice to 
focus on the other cases which remain within its jurisdiction. Impor-
tantly, any appeals taken from decisions of the Court of First Instance 
will be restricted to points of law.77 Therefore, the Court of Justice 
will not be troubled by the time consuming process of fact-finding 
when it reviews these cases. Hence, the efficiency of the court will be 
improved. 
The grant of jurisdiction to the new court is limited and excludes, 
in particular, cases relating to violations of Community law with re-
spect to dumping and violations of articles 92 and 93 with respect to 
state subsidies. The Council Decision did provide, however, that "in 
light of experience, including the development of jurisprudence, and 
after two years of operation of the [Court of First Instance]," it would 
re-examine the proposal of the Court of Justice to determine whether 
the new court's jurisdiction should be expanded to include additional 
classes of cases. 78 Such cases include, among others, dumping and 
subsidy cases noted above. 79 
Concerning cases involving challenges to decisions of the Com-
mission or the Council regarding violations of Community anti-
dumping laws, the Court of Justice has been significantly burdened by 
the considerable amount of detail and large number of documents en-
tailed in resolving such actions.80 Because of the particular nature of 
these cases, they have been very time consuming and have "impose[d] 
a disproportionately large burden on the [Court of Justice relative] to 
their number."81 There is evidence that based on the current eco-
nomic situation within the Community the number of anti-dumping 
76. Lang, supra note 59, at 592. "So far, particularly in trade cases, the Court has tended 
to concentrate on ensuring that procedural rules were strictly obeyed and, provided that this 
had been done, to accept the Commission's findings on factual and economic issues." Id. 
77. See infra note 88. 
78. See Council Decision, supra note l, at art. 3(3). 
79. Id. 
80. See Slynn, supra note 19, at 544. Anti-dumping cases have produced thousands of 
pages of pleadings and accompanying exhibits. Id. 
81. See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 23. 
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cases will continue to grow. 82 Such evidence includes the fact that in 
recent years the Commission has been increasingly required to investi-
gate claims by industries that companies outside the Community have 
dumped their products within the Community. 83 Therefore, based on 
the type of inquiries involved in adjudicating anti-dumping cases, it 
seems appropriate that they be transferred to the Court of First 
Instance. 84 
The Council Decision . indicates that one reason for not transfer-
ring jurisdiction over anti-dumping cases to the Court of First In-
stance is that jurisprudence in this area has not been sufficiently 
developed. 85 Another reason given is that the Community itself has 
not had much experience dealing with this type of infraction of Com-
munity law.86 
Concerning the need to develop jurisprudence in this area, it 
could be more quickly developed if the new court was given jurisdic-
tion to hear these cases at first instance. As noted, anti-dumping 
cases, like subsidy cases, involve complex factual inquiries which take 
82. See id.; see also Slynn, supra note 19, at 545-46. 
83. See Slynn, supra note 19, at 545-46. The types of cases the Commission has recently 
been asked to investigate have involved alleged dumping of electronic equipment from Japan 
and low priced refrigerators and minerals from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Id. 
(citing e.g., Technointors v. E.C. Commission, 3 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 491 (1987) (freezers 
from the USSR); Tokyo Elec. Co. Ltd. v. E.C. Council, 1 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 169 (1988); 
Celestri & Co. Spa v. Amministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato, 3 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 
181 (1985) (zinc coated steel sheets from East Germany); Re Anti-Dumping Proceeding Con-
cerning Imports of Certain Tubes of Iron or Steel Originating in Rumania, 1 COMM. MKT. L. 
REV. 504 (1980); Nashua Corp. v. E.C. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3467). 
84. Some have argued that by not granting the CFI jurisdiction over anti-dumping cases, 
the CFI may be underemployed. See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 23. 
85. See Council Decision, supra note 1, at art. 3(3). "[O]ne EEC expert explained, 'for 
the [C]ommunity, dumping legislation is a relatively new law where many questions are still 
open.' As a result, the EC Commission believes that relegating dumping cases to the lower 
court would not represent 'any [additional] easing of the [ECJ's] workload because outside 
trade lawyers have already indicated that they would appeal any dumping decisions to the 
higher court,' the expert said." See EC's New Inferior Court is Designed to Ease Burdens of the 
Court of Justice, 57 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 1432, (lnt'l Dev. Sec.), at 
358 (Sept. 14, 1989) [hereinafter EC's New Inferior Court]. 
86. See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 22. A majority of the Member States, as well as a 
majority of the members of the European Parliament and of the judges of the ECJ, supported 
extending the CFI's jurisdiction to anti-dumping and subsidy cases. Id. (citing a press release 
issued by the Information Office of the Court of Justice, dated June 13, 1988). Those against 
granting jurisdiction over dumping cases to the new court included the Commission and 
France. See Buchan, supra note 5, at 2, col. 6. "The Commission argued that those of its 
officials dealing with anti-dumping actions were overstretched enough without having to ap-
pear before two courts first in the lower-tier court, and then probably in the [ECJ] to defend 
their imposition of dumping fines." See id. 
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up an inordinate amount of the Court of Justice's time. 87 The Court 
of First Instance, on the other hand, was specifically created to handle 
these type of inquiries. If the new court was granted jurisdiction over 
anti-dumping cases, the Court of Justice's task in refining Community 
law would be facilitated as the only issues on appeal would be legal 
ones. 88 The Court of Justice would also benefit from the new court's 
analysis of the legal issues raised in such cases. Accordingly, Com-
munity law relating to dumping could be clarified much more quickly. 
Lastly, there are strong arguments that the Council should re-
consider its decision to exclude all reference opinions from the juris-
diction of the Court of First Instance. 89 It is true that a good number 
of the requests for preliminary rulings deal with unclear questions of 
Community law, and, therefore, it is appropriate that the Court of 
Justice hear them directly.90 However, there are also a number of 
reference opinions that in effect raise only questions of fact. A good 
illustration of this are requests for preliminary rulings on the classifi-
cation of particular products under the common customs tariffs.91 
How a particular product is classified involves a factual determination 
based largely on expert opinion. 92 The Council could consider adopt-
ing guidelines that would try to differentiate what types of questions 
87. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
88. An appeal from a decision of the CFI is limited to only points of law. See EEC 
Treaty, supra note 8, at art. l 68a. The Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice attached 
to the EEC Treaty, as amended by the Council's Decision, provides three grounds for appeal 
from the CFI to the ECJ. These include: 
1) A lack of competence of the CFI; 
2) A breach of procedure before the CFI that adversely affects the interests of the 
appellant; and, 
3) The infringement of Community law by the CFI. 
See Council Decision, supra note 1, at art. 7 (inserting Title IV, art. 51, into the Protocol on 
the Statute of the Court of Justice [hereinafter Protocol]). There will be no appeal regarding 
the amount of costs awarded or the party ordered to pay them. Id. 
89. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 168a(l). Article 168a(l) of the EEC Treaty 
specifically withholds from the jurisdiction of the CFI questions referred for preliminary rul-
ings by national courts of the Member States under article 177 of the Treaty. Id. This article 
also excludes actions brought by Member States or by Community Institutions. One reason 
offered for excluding cases that either directly or indirectly involve Member States is that it 
would be inappropriate for any Community legal body other than the ECJ to address them. 
See Schermers, supra note 50, at 543-44. However, some argue that "any suggestion of inferi-
ority of the new court is undesirable" and that the Community should reconsider including 
these cases within the CFl's jurisdiction. Id. 
90. See Schermers, supra note 50, at 543. 
91. Id. Judge David Edward, Britain's judge on the CFI, has argued that technical cus-
toms classification should be given to the CFI. See Rice, supra note 33, at 22, col. 4. 
92. See Schermers, supra note 50, at 543; see e.g., J. Cleton & Co. B.V. v. Inspecteur der 
Invoerrechten den Accijnzen, case No. 11/79, Oct. 4, 1979, 1979 E.C.R. 3069 (refrigerator v. 
air conditioning equipment). 
14
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 17, No. 1 [1991], Art. 6
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol17/iss1/6
1991] The Court of First Instance 255 
raise primarily factual issues and what types of questions raise pri-
marily legal issues. 93 Hence, if a reference request is referred to the 
Court of Justice and it determines the issues raised are primarily fac-
tual under the adopted guidelines, the request could be directed to the 
Court of First Instance for disposition. 
The Council has time to evaluate the above and other arguments 
before it considers expanding the Court of First Instance's jurisdiction 
in 1992. 
C. Composition, Organization and Rules of Procedure of the Court 
of First Instance 94 
1. Judges 
The Court of First Instance is composed of twelve judges who sit 
for six year terms. 9s In order to insure continuity of the new court, 
six of the members appointed initially will serve only a three year 
term, while the remaining six members will serve a full term. 96 As is 
the case with the Court of Justice, there is no provision requiring one 
judge from each Member State. 97 The omission of such a requirement 
is an expression of respect for judicial independence. 98 Nonetheless, 
93. What are legal and what are factual issues can sometimes be difficult to discern. Is-
sues raised in reference opinions may raise legal and factual issues that are so intertwined that 
they cannot be separated. See Lang, supra note 59, at 592. 
94. The CFI is located in Luxembourg, in the same building as the ECJ. The judges have 
their own personal staffs which include their law clerks. The number of law clerks may be 
increased as the caseload of the new court increases. The CFI will have its own registrar, 
however, it will share all other administrative support services with the ECJ. These include, 
translations, interpretations for oral hearings, finance, recruitment and other personnel 
matters, as well as other general services. See Council Decision, supra note 1, at art. 7 
(inserting Title IV, art. 45, into the Protocol); see generally Kennedy, supra note 23, at 24-25. 
95. See Council Decision, supra note 1, at art. 2. On July 31, 1989, the Conference of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States appointed judges to the CFI. The 
judges appointed include: Jose Luis da Cruz Vilaca, President (Portugal), Jacques Biancarelli 
(France), Cornelis Paulus Briet (Netherlands), David Alexander Ogilvy Edward (United 
Kingdom), Rafael Garcia-Valdecasas y Fernandez (Spain), Christos G. Geraris (Greece), 
Heinrich Kirschner (Germany), Koenraad Lenaerts (Belgium), Antonia Saggio (Italy), 
Romain Schintgen (Luxembourg), Bo V estrdorff (Denmark) and Donal Barrington (Ireland). 
Europe (Telex) July 31/Aug. 1, No. 5068 (1989). 
96. See Council Decision, supra note 1, at art. 12. 
97. See id. at art. 2. The proposal of the ECJ called for only seven judges to be appointed 
to the CFI. However, the difficulty with having only seven judges with 12 Member States in 
the Community is that a certain amount of anxiety is created for those Member States without 
a nominee on the new court. This anxiety could have been lessened if the ECJ proposal had 
been adopted by introducing a rotation system. See Schermers, supra note 50, at 546. 
Some have argued that having a judge from each Member State serves an important func-
tion by introducing the legal thinking and basic concerns of each Member State into the ECJ's 
consideration of cases. See Everling, supra note 10, at 1296. 
98. See Lenz, supra note 9, at 130. 
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the current judges of the court represent all the Member States of the 
Community.99 It is expected that each Member State will continue to 
be represented. too 
2. Chambers 
The Council Decision specifies that the Court of First Instance 
may sit in chambers consisting of three to five judges. 101 Under the 
court's recently formulated rules of procedure, the chambers of the 
court are broken down into two divisions. 102 The first division is com-
posed of three judges who will hear disputes between the Community 
and their servants, i.e., "staff cases."103 The second division is com-
posed of five judges who will hear all other cases within the court's 
jurisdiction. 104 
The designation of a division of chambers to specialize in hearing 
only one class of cases is unique to the Court of First Instance. Under 
the current rules of procedure of the Court of Justice, there are no 
specialized chambers. The apparent reason for designating staff cases 
to chambers composed of only three judges is the belief that such 
cases do not require as much judicial manpower to resolve as do the 
other cases within the new court's jurisdiction. · This is explained per-
haps by the fact that staff cases primarily involve factual determina-
tions for their resolution. 10s Commercial related cases, on the other 
hand, which are handled by five judge chambers, often require the 
court to address not only complex factual issues but legal issues as 
well. 
Under the Council Decision, whether the Court of First Instance 
would be required to sit in plenary session rather than in chambers, 
when hearing certain types of cases, was left to be established by the 
court's rules of procedure. 106 The court's newly formulated proce-
dural rules contain no such requirement. This is unlike the Court of 
Justice whose rules require that it sit in plenary session when hearing 
99. See supra note 95. 
100. See Lenz, supra note 9, at 130. 
101. See Council Decision, supra note 1, at art. 2(1). 
102. Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 136) 
1 (1990) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure of the CFI]. These rules have not yet entered into 
force. See infra note 133. 
103. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at art. 12. 
104. See id. 
105. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
106. See Council Decision, supra note l, at art. 2(4). 
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certain types of cases. 107 Such cases include, inter alia, actions 
brought by Member States and by Institutions of the Community. 108 
Significantly, the Court of First Instance does not have jurisdiction to 
hear these type of cases or any other which must be heard by the 
Court of Justice in plenary session. 
While the rules of procedure do not require the Court of First 
Instance to sit in plenary session, the rules do indicate that "whenever 
the legal difficulty or the importance of [a] case or special circum-
stances so justify, the [Court of First Instance] may ... decide to refer 
[a] case to a bench composed of ·a different number of Judges" than 
contained in the one to which it was assigned. 109 Hence, it is possible 
for the court to sit in plenary session when hearing important cases. 110 
The language of the above quoted provision also suggests that the 
court could sit in chambers containing more than five judges but less 
than all the judges of the court. 111 This gives the Court of First In-
stance considerable flexibility to add judicial manpower when needed 
to handle important and/or difficult cases. 112 Interestingly, the Court 
of Justice does not have a similar provision in its rules to augment the 
number of judges in its chambers. 113 
3. Advocate General 
The Council Decision provides that the Court of First Instance 
will have the assistance of Advocate Generals in rendering its deci-
sions.114 Under the procedural system of the new court, which is 
based largely on the continental legal system of Europe, 11s the main 
107. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 165, as amended by the Rules of Procedure of 
the ECJ, supra note 30, at art. 95. 
108. See id. 
109. See Rules of Procedure of CFI, supra note 102, at art. 14. 
110. At any stage of the proceedings, a case may be referred to a different number of 
judges than contained in the chamber to which it is assigned. See id. at art. 51 . The decision 
to increase the number of judges hearing a case will be made after a proposal has been made to 
that effect by the Judge-Rapporteur, and after consultation with the Advocate General as-
signed to the case. Id. 
111. The voting in a chamber that has other than three or five judges is governed by 
article 32(4) of the CFl's Rules of Procedure. 
112. The language of the CFl's Rules of Procedure would also seem to allow a decrease 
in the number of judges in a chamber. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at 
art. 142. Hence, this also gives the CFI flexibility to conserve judicial manpower in less impor-
tant cases and/ or less difficult cases. 
113. There appears no reason why the ECJ could not similarly adopt a rule that would 
allow it to increase or decrease the number of judges in a chamber, depending on the complex-
ity and importance of a case. 
114. See Council Decision, supra note 1, at art. 2. 
115. See Schermers, supra note 50, at 552. 
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task of an Advocate General is to act "with complete impartiality and 
independence" in making opinions in open court on certain cases "in 
order to assist the [Court of First Instance] in the performance of its 
task." 116 In brief, an Advocate General participates in the written 
and oral stages of the court's proceedings, 117 though he does not take 
part in deliberations. 118 An Advocate General "will review the facts 
of [a] case, deal with submissions of the parties and of any others who 
have taken part of the proceedings, review the law, and finally [ex-
press] his own opinion on how the judges should decide the case." 119 
The opinion of the Advocate General, usually made at a hearing after 
the parties have delivered their arguments, is not binding on the 
judges hearing the case, rather it is meant only to assist the members 
of the court in reaching their judgment.120 
Unlike the practice of the Court of Justice, an Advocate General 
will not be assigned to every case heard by the court.121 The rules 
provide that one will be assigned to a case if the action is being heard 
by the court in plenary session. 122 Otherwise, an Advocate General 
will only be assigned "if it is considered that the legal difficulty or the 
factual complexity [of a case] so require." 123 . 
The rationale for having Advocate Generals assigned to all cases 
heard by the Court of Justice, at least prior to the creation of the 
Court of First Instance, was that the Court of Justice was the first and 
last forum of review with respect to rulings on Community law.124 It 
was believed that the assistance of the Advocate General was neces-
sary to ensure that Community law was properly interpreted. 12s This 
rationale does not, however, support having Advocate Generals as-
signed to cases heard by the Court of First Instance as legal issues 
reviewed by the new court may be appealed to the Court of Justice. 
116. See Council Decision, supra note 1, at art. 2(3). 
117. See infra notes 138-158 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the written 
and oral stages of proceedings before the court. 
118. See Council Decision, supra note 1, at art. 2(3). 
119. L.N. BROWN & F.G. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CoM-
MUNITIES 54 (1989). 
120. See id. An Advocate General essentially serves as official amicus curiae. Id. at 55. 
121. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at arts. 17 and 18. 
122. See id. at art. 17. 
123. See id. at art. 18. The decision to designate an Advocate General in a particular case 
will be voted on by the members of the CFI at the request of the chamber to which the case is 
assigned or devolved. See id. at art. 19. The President of the CFI will designate the court 
member who will serve as Advocate General. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 
102, at art. 19. 
124. See Lenz, supra note 9, at 130. 
125. Id. 
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Hence, there are two forums of review concerning rulings on Commu-
nity law. 
In connection with the above, some have asserted that Advocate 
Generals are not essential to the Court of First Instance because its 
main task is fact-finding, not resolving difficult legal issues. 126 While 
this is essentially true, it is also true that unsettled questions of Com-
munity law will still arise in the cases heard by the court. This may 
not perhaps occur with regard to staff cases, but it is likely to occur 
with regard to the other two categories of cases heard by the court 
which deal with Community commercial law. In addition, unsettled 
questions of Community law will likely become more frequent if the 
jurisdiction of the new court is expanded in the future. 
Lastly, when called upon, members of the court will serve as Ad-
vocate Generals. 127 This is different from the practice followed by the 
Court of Justice, where the Advocate Generals, six in total, are ap-
pointed separately from the judges of the court. 128 As the Court of 
First Instance currently has a limited caseload, it is not necessary that 
the Advocate Generals be appointed separately from the judges of the 
court. This should be reconsidered, however, if the new court's juris-
diction is expanded. 
4. Procedural Rules 
The procedures before the Court of First Instance are governed 
by the Council Decision establishing the court, 129 the Protocol on the 
Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, as 
amended, 130 and the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First 
Instance. 131 
126. See Schermers, supra note 50, at 549. The ECJ did not recommend in its proposal to 
the Council that the CFI should have Advocate Generals assigned to it. Id. 
127. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at art. 19. The President of the 
CFI may never serve as an Advocate General. Id. at art. 9. A judge selected to serve as an 
Advocate General on a particular case most likely will not be a member of the chamber to 
which the case has been assigned. 
128. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 166. 
129. See Council Decision, supra note 1, at arts. 2 and 11. 
130. Acting pursuant to article 12 of the SEA Treaty, the Council amended Title III of 
the Protocol attached to the EEC Treaty to include provisions concerning the operations of the 
CFI. See id. at art. 7. The amended Protocol provides that the procedures of the CFI will be 
governed by Title III, with the exception of article 20, and the newly inserted Title IV of the 
Protocol. See id. (inserting Title IV, art. 46, into the Protocol). Acting under the SEA Treaty, 
the Council also amended in its Decision, the Protocol attached to the ECSC and EURA TOM 
Treaties to include parallel provisions to the ones referenced in regard to the Protocol attached 
to the EEC Treaty. See id. at arts. 5, 6, 9 and 10. 
131. See Council Decision, supra note 1, at art. 7 (inserting Title IV, art. 46, into the 
Protocol). 
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The Protocol and the Council Decision provide for the general 
organizational framework of the court as well as for the general pro-
cedural process case& will follow. Several of the provisions contained 
in these documents have already been briefly discussed. Concerning 
the day to day operations of the court, they will be primarily governed 
by the new court's rules of procedure. Acting pursuant to article 11 
of the Council Decision, the court recently formulated its own proce-
dural rules which are currently awaiting approval by the Council. 132 
Until the rules enter into force, the court will apply mutatis mutandis 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.133 
Space does not permit a detailed discussion of the lengthy proce-
dural rules contained in the above referenced sources. For purposes 
of this Note, the discussion will focus only on the procedural meas-
ures that relate to fact finding by the Court of First Instance, since 
this is its principal task. Any significant differences in the manner in 
which facts are found by the Court of First Instance, that vary from 
the manner in which they are found by the Court of Justice, will be 
highlighted. 
The procedures for establishing facts are, as expected, essentially 
identical to those followed by the Court of Justice. 134 As is the case 
with the Court of Justice, there is no "trial" as the term is understood 
in common law countries. 135 Rather, the determination of facts as 
well as law is spread over a considerable period of time. 136 A brief, 
though simplified, explanation of these procedures is as follows. 137 
Proceedings before the Court of First Instance are divided into 
two phases: the written phase and the oral phase. 138 During the writ-
ten phase, the parties file documents resembling pleadings. 139 At-
tached to the pleadings is the written evidence of the parties. 140 After 
132. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102. 
133. See id. at art. 11. The Council is expected to approve the CFl's procedural rules 
sometime in May of 1991. Upon approval, the rules will enter into force on the first day of the 
second month following their publication in the "L" series of the Official Journal. Id. at art. 
130. 
134. See Schermers, supra note 50, at 552. 
135. See Herzog, Tire Procedure Before the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
41 WASH. L. REV. 438, 454 (1966). 
136. See id. 
137. Where there are any notable variations between the procedural rules of the CFI and 
the ECJ they are referenced in the accompanying notes to the text. 
138. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at arts. 43-55 (written proce-
dures) and arts. 56-63 (oral procedures). 
139. See id. at art. 43. The documents differ from pleadings submitted in American 
courts in that they contain legal arguments. 
140. See id. 
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the appropriate documents have been submitted, the Judge-Rap-
porteur of the chamber assigned to hear the case141 will review the 
documents and prepare a preliminary report. 142 The report will con-
tain a summary of the facts and legal issues raised in the case. 143 The 
report will also contain a recommendation whether "measures of or-
ganization of procedure"144 or "measures of inquiry"14s should be un-
dertaken and whether the case should be referred to a bench 
composed of a different number of judges.146 
The bench hearing the case will then decide whether to adopt 
any of the recommendations contained in the preliminary report. 147 
If the recommendations are not adopted, the case will be scheduled 
for oral hearing. 148 If the recommendations are adopted, they are im-
plemented.149 When they have been completed, the Judge-Rap-
porteur will prepare a final report summarizing the legal and factual 
issues in the case.1so The case will then either be decided,1s1 or as will 
most often occur, be scheduled for oral hearing.1 s2 If the matter is to 
be decided at this point, the Advocate General, if one is assigned to 
the case, will deliver his opinion in open court, either orally or in 
writing, as to how the case should be decided.1s3 After the opinion is 
141. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at art. 13 § 2. One of the judges 
assigned to the chamber to which the case has been referred is designated to act as rapporteur. 
Id. The Judge-Rapporteur, unlike an Advocate General, will participate in deliberations. 
142. See id. at art. 52 § 1. 
143. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at art. 51 § 1. 
144. See id. at art. 64. As will be discussed, see infra notes 165-180 and accompanying 
text, "measures of procedure" are unique to the CFl's Rules of Procedure. There are no com-
parable measures found in the ECJ's Rules of Procedure. 
145. As discussed further below, see infra notes 159-162 and accompanying text, the 
measures of inquiry available to the CFI, such as the ability of the court to request the produc-
tion of documents or call witnesses, are identical to those available to the ECJ. 
146. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at art. 52 § 1; see also supra text 
at notes 109-113 (discussion noting that there is no comparable provision in the ECJ's proce-
dural rules with respect to increasing or decreasing the number of judges that are in a chamber 
to which a case has been assigned). 
147. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at art. 52 § 2. Guided by the 
preliminary report and any recommendation of the Advocate General, the court decides what 
issues of fact, if any, need to be proven and what measures of inquiry will be used for this 
purpose. See L.N. BROWN & F.G. JACOBS, supra note 119, at 230. 
148. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at art. 52 § 2. 
149. See id. 
150. The CFl's rules of procedure do not specifically indicate that a final report will be 
prepared by the Judge-Rapporteur after measures of inquiry have been completed by the court. 
However, this practice is followed by the ECJ and is likely to be followed by the CFI. See L.N. 
BROWN & F.G. JACOBS, supra note 119, at 230. 
151. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at art. 55. 
152. See id. at art. 54. 
153. See id. at arts. 55 and 61. 
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delivered, the proceedings are closed and deliberations are begun. 1s4 
If the matter proceeds to the oral phase, the parties present their 
legal and factual arguments in the case. 1ss The members of the bench, 
including the Advocate General, may put questions to the parties. 1s6 
After the arguments have been heard, the Advocate General, if as-
signed to the case, will deliver his opinion in the same manner as de-
scribed above. 1s7 The president of the chamber will then declare the 
oral phase of the hearings closed and deliberations will begin. 1 ss 
The fact that the Court of First Instance's above described proce-
dural rules are very similar to those of the Court of Justice is signifi-
cant. This is particularly the case with respect to the measures of 
inquiry available to both courts. Under its recently formulated rules 
of procedure, the Court of First Instance is granted the same meas-
ures of inquiry as those granted to the Court of Justice. 1s9 These 
measures include, inter alia, the ability of the court to call witnesses, 
request information and the production of documents, and request the 
presence of and pose questions to the parties. 160 As indicated earlier, 
these measures are employed during the written phase of the proceed-
ings to assist the court in the factual investigation of cases. 161 
The significance of the measures of inquiry being identical is that 
it demonstrates that the drafters of the rules believed the factual in-
vestigatory devices available to the Court of Justice were adequate 
enough to be given to the Court of First Instance to fulfill its role as a 
fact-finding court. 162 The advantage the new court will have over the 
Court of Justice is that it will not be as heavily burdened with work. 
154. See id. at art. 55. The bench hearing the case may deliver judgment without oral 
argument from the agents, advisors or lawyers of the parties, "unless one of the parties objects 
on the ground that the written procedure did not enable him to fully defend his point of view." 
See id. 
155. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at art. 57. All judges assigned to 
the chamber hearing the case must be present at the oral hearing or they cannot participate in 
deciding the case. Id. at art. 33 § 2. 
156. See id. at art. 58. 
157. See id . . at art. 61. 
158. See id. at arts. 60 and 61. The bench may, after hearing from the Advocate Gen-
eral, order the reopening of the oral procedure. See id. at art. 62. 
159. Compare article 45 § 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECJ, supra note 30, with 
article 65 of the Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102. 
160. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at art. 65. 
161. The court must make an order specifying the measures of inquiry to be used. See 
L.N. BROWN & F.G. JACOBS, supra note 119, at 227. 
162. Prior to the publication of the CFl's procedural rules, there were some who felt that 
the ECJ's procedural rules were sufficiently flexible to be adopted almost in toto by the CFI. 
See Lang, supra note 59, at 552. 
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Hence, it will be in a better position to make full use of these investi-
gatory devices. 
In connection with the above, an observation should be made 
with regard to who is present when the measures of inquiry are being 
employed. Under the procedural rules of both the Court of First In-
stance and the Court of Justice, the measures of inquiry will be con-
ducted by the bench or be assigned to the Judge-Rapporteur. 163 If an 
Advocate General is assigned to a case he will also participate. 164 One 
problem perhaps with this arrangement is that only the Judge-Rap-
porteur and the Advocate General are actually required to be present 
while the important phase of factual investigations is taking place. 
With regard to the Court of Justice, it has sometimes been the case 
that only these individuals were present. As a result, the absent 
judges could not personally weigh the credibility of witnesses or ex-
perts that may have testified, or consider for themselves any docu-
ments that were submitted. They had to rely, therefore, solely on the 
findings found in the Judge-Rapporteur's report. 
The reason the Court of Justice followed such a practice was in 
part attributable to the heavy caseload placed on its judges. The 
Court of First Instance, on the other hand, has a limited jurisdiction 
and a relatively light caseload in comparison. Therefore, it would not 
be unreasonable to require judges who are not assigned to be either a 
Judge-Rapporteur or an Advocate General to participate in the meas-
ures of inquiry. The Council might reconsider adopting such a re-
quirement particularly in light of the fact that the new court's basic 
purpose is to find facts. 
Lastly, one important addition to the Court of First Instance's 
rules of procedure, that has no counterpart in the Court of Justice's 
rules of procedure, is the provision relating to the "measures of organ-
ization of procedure."16s As shown below, the addition of this provi-
sions is apparently intended to streamline and make more efficient the 
operations of the new court, in particular the court's fact-finding 
capability. 
Article 64, section 1, of the court's rules of procedure specify that 
163. See Rules of Procedure of the ECJ, supra note 30, at art. 45 § 3; see Rules of Proce-
dure of the CFI, supra note 102, at art. 53 § 1. Under article 53 of the CFl's Rules of Proce-
dure, where a case is being heard in plenary session, the CFI may participate in measures of 
inquiry as a whole or assign it to the chamber from which the case originated or to the Judge-
Rapporteur of that chamber. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at art. 53 § 1. 
164. See Rules of Procedure of the ECJ, supra note 30, at art. 45 § 1; see Rules of Proce-
dure of the CFI, supra note 102, at art. 67 § 1. 
165. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 102, at art. 64. 
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the "[m]easures of organization of procedure shall, in particular, have 
as their purpose: 
(a) to ensure efficient conduct of the written and oral procedure and 
to facilitate the taking of evidence; 
(b) to determine the points on which the parties must present further 
arguments or which call for measures of inquiry; 
( c) to clarify the form of order sought by the parties, their submis-
sions and arguments and the points at issue between them; 
(d) to facilitate the amicable settlement of proceedings."166 
While the rules specify the various purposes of the measures of 
organization of procedure, they do not indicate exactly what the 
measures are. 167 However, based on the language of the rules, it 
seems apparent that the measures entail something similar in sub-
stance to a pre-trial order, which is commonly found in the American 
judicial system. 168 The general purpose of such a document is to clar-
ify the legal and factual issues in dispute before a case proceeds to 
trial. While there is no "trial" in a case before the Court of First 
Instance, 169 measures of organization of procedure appear to accom-
plish the same task. The measures also seem to go beyond this, to 
encompass all measures that will assist the court in quickly and effi-
ciently resolving disputes that come before it. 110 
It seems apparent that the measures of organization of proce-
dure, if properly used, will facilitate the efficient running of the Court 
of First Instance. Furthermore, there does not seem to be any reason 
why the Court of Justice should not adopt a similar provision in its 
own procedural rules. In fact, it may be of greater value to the Court 
of Justice because of its larger caseload. 
166. See id. at art. 64 § 2. 
167. The CFI's procedural rules indicate that the measures of organization of procedure 
will be prescribed by the l>ench after hearing from the Advocate General. Id. at art. 64 § 1. 
168. The measures of organization of procedure may have been influenced to some extent 
by a provision in the German Code of Civil Procedure, which was added as part of a major 
revision in 1976. See Zivilprozessordung § 272 (1977). Under section 272 of the German 
Code of Civil Procedure the presiding judge must at the beginning of the proceedings render a 
decision indicating how the main hearing, which should terminate the case, should be pre-
pared. See id.; see also L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 642-43 (14th 
rev. ed. 1986). The judge has two options, he may either order the parties to attend an early 
preliminary hearing to prepare the case, or he may order the parties to continue exchanging 
writings to simplify and clarify the issues. See L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, supra, at 642-
43. 
169. See supra note 135-136 and accompanying text. 
170. The CFI's procedural rules indicate that measures of organization of procedure may 
be undertaken at any stage of the proceedings. See Rules of Procedure of the CFI, supra note 
102, at art. 49. 
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IV. IMPACT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 
In 1989 more than 150 cases were transferred from the Court of 
Justice to the Court of First Instance. 171 This figure represented ap-
proximately one quarter of the Court of Justice's arrears. 172 Under 
the present grant of jurisdiction, the types of cases transferred to the 
new court have in past years represented approximately twenty to 
twenty-five percent of the Court of Justices caseload. 173 While this 
still leaves the Court of Justice with a substantial number of cases, 174 
it is certainly a step forward in relieving some of the court's burden. 175 
Importantly, the types of cases assumed by the Court of First In-
stance, particularly those involving violations of the ECSC Treaty and 
infringements of articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, are ones which 
have received a disproportionate amount of the Court of Justice's at-
tention because of the complex factual questions involved in resolving 
them. 176 Accordingly, the court will be left with more time to focus 
on shortening the waiting period for reference opinions and on reduc-
ing the number of cases in arrears. 
It is too early to say whether the Court of First Instance will 
fulfill the goals set for it by the Community. The new court's long 
term success will be evidenced by the refinement of Community law 
through the development of better case law .177 Recognition of the 
success of the new court will also be seen if the Council decides to 
expand, as it should, the court's jurisdiction to include the other 
171. See XXIllRD GENERAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 41-42. In 1989, the CFI dealt 
with a total of 169 cases, 153 of them transferred from the ECJ. Id. For a listing of the cases 
transferred to the CFI see 32 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. C 317) 10-12 (1989). 
172. See EC Bulletin, supra note 38, at 11. In 1989, the total number of cases pending 
before the ECJ was 649. See XXIIIRD GENERAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 436. 
173. See EC Bulletin, supra note 38, at 11. 
174. Some have argued that the true worth of the new court will be seen only when the 
CFI assumes approximately 50% of the ECJ's caseload and the arrears are substantially re-
duced. See id. 
175. See id. The extent to which the burden on the ECJ will actually be relieved is in part 
dependent upon the number of appeals the ECJ will hear. Some have indicated that any relief 
given to the ECJ may be short lived in light of the anticipated increase in complaints related to 
the completion of the EC's Single Market. See EC's New Inferior Court, supra note 85, at 358. 
Some expect the caseload of the ECJ to escalate back to the level it was before the creation of 
the CFI. Id. 
176. Interestingly, one of the very first competition law decisions rendered by the CFI 
raised solely questions of law. See Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission, Case T-51/89, July 
10, 1990, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 193) 10 (1990). The question raised, which the court 
answered in the affirmative, was whether it was possible to be in breach of article 86 of the 
EEC Treaty with respect to conduct benefiting from an exemption under article 85(3) of the 
same treaty. 
177. See EC Bulletin, supra note 38, at 11. 
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classes of cases recommended in the Court of Justice's proposal. 178 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Court of First Instance will increasingly assume, particu-
larly if its jurisdiction is expanded, a greater role in the Community. 
Its existence will have a significant impact in the future on the ability 
of the Court of Justice to enforce and interpret Community law. 
Neil J. Weidner 
178. Though not included in the ECJ's proposal to the Council, other types of cases likely 
to be considered for transfer to the CFI include actions for damages and State Aids. See 
Kennedy, supra note 23, at 29. 
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